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Flexible Rate Filing Insurance Rate 
Regulation as Alternative to Incentive 
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Abstract 
Competition can be an effective regulator of rates in property-casualty insurance markets. While many states have 
moved to file-and-use or use-and-file provisions, some have adopted flexible rate-filing regulations (flex-rating) as a 
means of combining competitive forces with prior-approval regulation. This short note proposes a change to flex-
rating so that it can be used to gradually transition a state from prior-approval to file-and-use or use-and-file. 
This Version October 17, 2008 
First Version January 26, 2008 




PhD Student, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, 
J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University 
 
 
                                                            
1 Copyright © 2008 Jason Strauss 
Email: jstrauss2@student.gsu.edu . This short note was written after completing a consulting project for The Alberta 
Automobile Insurance Rate Board entitled, “Flexible Rate-Filing Regulatory Systems and Automobile Insurance- 
Survey, Discussion and Analysis,” (February 14, 2008). All errors remain my own and the content of this short note 
is my own opinion.   Introduction 
The  National  Association  of  Insurance  Commissioners  (NAIC)  holds  the  position  that  competition  can  be  an 
effective regulator of rates in property-casualty insurance markets (Eley 2000, p. 281). Also, much of the academic 
literature on the topic of rate regulation asserts that competition delivers greater benefits than does binding rate 
regulation. For example, see (Cummins 2002). 
Nevertheless, some regulators may be hesitant to suddenly shift to competitive rating. Although some regulators 
have moved to flexible rate-filing regulation (flex-rating), most of the states with flex-rating have thresholds that are 
legislatively fixed and as such, do not provide the option of a transition to competitive rating—this note proposes 
that flex-rating be a vehicle for regulatory transition.  
Flexible Rate-Filing Regulation 
Flex-rating generally allows an insurer to increase or decrease rates within a “flex band” without prior approval 
while still requiring prior approval for rate changes outside of the flex band (Insurance Information Institute 2008). 
The combination of the two systems (use-and-file or file-and-use co-joined with prior approval) into the flex-rating 
system  allows  insurers  to  make  small  rate  adjustments  on  a  yearly  basis  to  accommodate  changing  costs, 
frequencies, or severities. 
Flex-rating is and can be used in a number of different property-casualty lines including homeowner’s, commercial, 
and personal auto. For personal auto, it is currently used in Alaska, North Dakota, Kentucky, South Carolina, New 
Jersey,  Rhode  Island,  and  Connecticut  (Property  Casualty  Insurers  Association  of  America  2007).  Table  1 
summarizes the characteristics of flex-rating systems in these states. 
Table 1, Summary of States With Personal Automobile Insurance Flex-Rating Systems 




# of Allowed 
Simplified 
Filings Per Year/ 
12 Months 
Rate 
Level  Other*  Simplified †  Prior 
Approval  
Alaska  10%  n/a  n/a  30 days  no  multiple 
North Dakota  5%  n/a  n/a  60 days  yes  1 
Kentucky  n/a  25%  n/a  30 days  yes  multiple 
South 
Carolina  7%  25%  30 days  60 days  yes  1 
New Jersey** 
3%  10%, 




Rhode Island  5%  n/a  n/a  30 days  yes  multiple 
Connecticut  6%  n/a  n/a  30 days  no  multiple 
While  there  are  more  details  to  flex-rating  in  different  lines,  this  table  summarizes  the  main 
features and variance in rules among states that use it for automobile insurance. 
†Simplified filings are those that are either file-and-use or use-and-file. 
* “Other” refers to either a threshold that applies to risk classifications or one that applies to 
coverage rates and factors (depending on the state). 
** New Jersey’s system allows for limited filings as opposed to flex-rate filings. 
 Table 1 summarizes the typical characteristics of flex-rating: thresholds on the rate level, risk classification, or 
coverage rates and factors; a shorter wait-time relative to the prior approval process; sometimes the absence of 
actuarial support for simplified filings; the number of allowed filings per year or twelve months under the simplified 
filing process. These factors can combine to make the simplified file-and-use or use-and-file process more attractive 
to insurers than the prior-approval process and may reduce actuarial and/or administrative costs to prepare and 
review filings. 
A Minute Problem with Typical Flex-Rating Systems 
The problem with flex-rating systems is that they are typically based on controlling changes relative to last year’s 
rates. If an insurer in North Dakota has a rate level that is indexed at 100 in 2008, the maximum rate level he can 
achieve in 2009 will be 105 and in 2010 will be 110.25 and in 2011 will be 115.76… and so on. However, if the 
insurer in North Dakota takes even one rate level decrease, he will never be able to attain the same rate levels in the 
future (under/using the simplified filing process) that he would otherwise have been capable of achieving. Although 
he will be able to regain the rate level using a prior-approval filing, a one-time rate reduction under flex-rating 
permanently lowers the achievable rate level (through simplified filings) for all other years. Therefore, there is a 
small incentive compatibility problem with current flex-rating systems that may work against the intended aim of 
the regulator(s). Expectations of future increases may prevent insurers from lowering premium rates in the short 
term for fear of not being able to raise rates when needed.  
The typical flex-rating system sets a threshold for the rate level but does not set it for any individual coverage or risk 
classification. This means that an insurer can change the rates by any amount for any risk classifications so long as 
the  overall  rate  level  remains  unchanged.  Some  states  also  (or  only)  place  restrictions  on  individual  risk 
classifications. Interestingly, a threshold that applies to risk classifications and not to the rate level effectively limits 
rate level changes as well. Kentucky, for example, has a threshold of 25% that applies to risk classifications but not 
to the overall rate level, meaning that no risk classification should receive rate increases under the simplified filing 
process that are greater than 25% per year; since insurers cannot raise any individual risk classification by more than 
25%, they cannot raise their overall rate level by more than 25% either. This means that the incentive compatibility 
problem applies to both types of thresholds: rate level as well as risk classifications/ coverages. 
Consider the hypothetical case of an insurer in North Dakota, with a rate level that we arbitrarily index to 100, as 
above. If an insurer takes a simplified rate level decrease of 5% so that his 2009 rate level is 95, the most it can ever 
be in 2010 is 99.75 and the most it can ever be in 2011 is 104.74; in both 2010 and 2011, the figures are strictly 
lower than they could have been if he had not taken that one-time rate decrease. This will be true for all years after 
the rate cut. 
As  the  time  horizon  lengthens,  the  difference  between  what  can  be  and  what  could-have-been  widens.  These 
differences are actually an opportunity cost to the insurer—an opportunity that is foregone when he takes a one-time 
rate decrease. If these opportunity costs are discounted back to the time at which the insurer decides to take a rate 
decrease or not, the net-present-value could potentially be of a large magnitude. Although the rate decrease might 
only lower yearly revenue by a small magnitude, the actual cost, the opportunity cost, is larger. 
And so, the problem with typical flex-rating systems is that the actual cost of a rate decrease (the discounted value of 
all of the lost opportunity) is actually higher than it appears to be (ignoring the prior approval opportunity for rate 
increases).  When  an  insurer  decides  whether  to  take  a  rate  decrease  under  flex-rating,  he  should  consider  the opportunity cost
2. Given a high opportunity cost, rate decrease filings may not be as numerous and/or substantial as 
they otherwise might be. 
A Possible Solution 
A possible solution to the problem was hinted at in the state of New York when flex-rating for personal automobile 
insurance was experimented with (discontinued August 2, 2001).  New York’s regulation dictated that insurers could 
reduce their rates but that they could always come back to the highest rate level they had previously been approved 
for (see Regulation No. 153 (11 NYCRR 163) Section 163.2 (e)). 
Prima facie, this may appear to be against the consumer’s interest, but given the ability of competitive forces to 
regulate rates, it would likely be the opposite. An insurer that knows it can always come back to its previously 
approved rate level (or higher) should be more willing to lower rates in any time period than he otherwise would 
have been willing to do, ceteris paribus. 
Dynamic Transition from Prior Approval to Competitive Forces 
Regulators who suppress rates generally recognize that in order for the participation constraint to be met, rates must 
increase with costs. If a rate level of 100 is approved in 2008 and costs increase by 5%, a rate level of 105 in 2009 
should be permissible, and so on. 
Regulators intent on moving towards competitive forces can use an altered flex-rating system to achieve a gradual 
transition. The altered flex-rating system would include an indexing of rate levels but the index would increase each 
year regardless of whether the insurer filed for higher rates or not. If the rate level was 100 in 2008 and the threshold 
was 5%, the rate level index would increase to 105 in 2009 and 110.25 in 2010 and 115.76 in 2011 and so on. 
Regardless of what the insurer’s rates were in 2010, he could always use rates up to and including the rate level of 
115.76 in 2011. In order to phase-out the prior-approval portion of flex-rating, the threshold would only need to be 
larger than the cost increase. 
For this to work, the cost increase would have to be that which is particular to the automobile insurance product. In 
the absence of a good measure of automobile insurance product inflation, proxies might be considered/ created from 
general economic price level information. 
So long as the flex-rating threshold was larger than the increase in automobile insurance costs, the relative size of 
the flex-rating threshold would increase each year so that the flex-rating threshold would eventually be non-binding 
on all insurers’ rate setting processes.
 The threshold could be cost increases plus some loading of, say, one, two, 
three percent or more. Depending on the size of the loading, the state would reach a de facto competitive system 
earlier or later. 
If the size of the flex-rating threshold (which is really a “band” within which insurers can change prices without 
prior-approval) grows/ increases in relative size each year, the “band” will eventually become a moot issue since it 
will not bind upon any insurers.  
                                                            
2 Although all flex-rating states would still allow the insurer to make a filing for a higher rate level increase using 
the prior approval process, on the aggregate, it is likely that there would be fewer rate filing decreases than there 
otherwise  could  be—the  NPV  opportunity  cost  makes  it  much  more  costly  to  file  for  a  rate  decrease  than  it 
otherwise would be.  Conclusion 
This brief note has outlined flex-rating for insurance rate regulation as a mechanism for gradual transition from 
prior-approval  to  competitive  rating  in  property-casualty  insurance  markets.  It  has  also  identified  that  the 
opportunity cost of a simplified rate decrease under flex-rating may be much larger than it appears to be. 
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